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*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Staff Intelligence Group

FROM : Chief, B/E [REDACTED] 25X1C4bp

SUBJECT: Comment on [REDACTED]  
25X1C4b

DATE: 7 March 1949

1. Following is our comment on subject paper as requested in your memorandum of 3 March 1949.

a. Page 1, paragraph 3.

It is recommended that the following sentence be added to the end of this paragraph; "Should an unpredictable and highly variable factor take place - such as a severe economic depression in the United States - the possibility of a Soviet miscalculation would be greatly enhanced."

b. Page 2, paragraph 2.

Communist progress has been over-stated and it is recommended that this paragraph be revised as follows:

"The political and ideological offensive which the Soviet Leaders are conducting is expensive, but very much less so than war. The capabilities of this offensive have not yet been exhausted, and the Soviets are unlikely to abandon it in favor of direct military action. Soviet leaders, however, cannot regard its progress as satisfactory. Communist influence in Western Europe has been contained and Soviet concern is evident in their new policy of foregoing mass appeal in favor of hard cores of international communists. The very restraint with which the Soviets have followed developments in China indicates that they do not regard, by any means, the victory of their own brand of Communism as absolutely sure. The Near and Middle East, as well as the Far East, provide further limited opportunities for the expansion of Communist influence which have yet to be fully exploited."

c. Page 2, paragraph 5.

It is recommended that in this paragraph consideration be given to two significant factors which would effect Soviet industrial potential in case of war, namely, (1) industrial potential gained by the Soviets in overrunning Western Europe, and (2) effect of atomic bombing on Soviet industrial potential.

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*(believed to be true)*  
*(or new)*

(2)

d. Page 5, paragraph 17.

*CIA would  
have presented*

The contents of this paragraph have been outdated principally because of the success of Berlin air lift throughout the winter. Last fall the Soviets may have believed the blockade would force the West to enter into negotiations, but whether they still believe this is highly questionable.

*It is suggested that this paragraph be revised to present the Berlin situation in a more optimistic vein.*

e. Page 5, paragraph 20.

It is believed that Soviet interpretation of Western intentions is oversimplified in this paragraph. It is recommended that the last sentence be deleted from this paragraph and that the following sentence be added: "It is most likely, however, that such moves will be interpreted as initial and necessary steps toward eventual aggression."

f. Page 5, paragraph 21.

Suggest that in the last sentence of this paragraph the word "retreat" be substituted for the word "withdraw."

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